Friday, September 16, 2016

Impossible to Restore

Hebrews 6:4–6 is often associated with the perennial debate as to whether or not Christians can “lose” their salvation. Here’s that passage:

“For it is impossible, in the case of those who have once been enlightened, who have tasted the heavenly gift, and have shared in the Holy Spirit, and have tasted the goodness of the word of God and the powers of the age to come, and then have fallen away, to restore them again to repentance, since they are crucifying once again the Son of God to their own harm and holding him up to contempt.”

To my knowledge, there are basically three views as to what exactly is going on in this passage, and each of them, in my assessment, has strengths and weaknesses.

The first view is, to an extent, the most straight-forward. It maintains that the people here spoken of are indeed true believers who are sincerely born again, and that they lose this salvation once they “have fallen away.”

But one of the main problems with this view is that those who hold to it typically believe that once a person has “lost” his salvation, he can still be saved again at some point in the future. In other words, he can still be restored. But that’s precisely what the passage says is impossible. So whoever wants to maintain this first view needs to make sure they’re willing to stand toe-to-toe with everything that the passage says.

The second view argues that the people in view in this passage are those who outwardly appear to be believers, but are not in fact true believers. Those who hold this view are thus faced with the task of explaining the numerous ways in which these supposed non-believers are described in the passage. These are people who have been enlightened, have tasted the heavenly gift, have shared in the Holy Spirit, have tasted the goodness of the word of God, and have experienced the powers of the age to come. Yet for all this, these people are not truly born again, according to proponents of this view.

Being enlightened is said to refer to the general sense in which every man is enlightened by the incarnation of Christ and the message of the gospel (John 1:9). Tasting the heavenly gift might refer to participation in the Lord’s supper, or to an acceptance of salvation in a general sense. But the notion of “tasting” indicates a very momentary and fleeting experience, rather than something deep and heart-felt. Sharing in the Holy Spirit might simply refer to a close proximity with the Spirit through participation in corporate worship, and not necessarily an experience of regeneration. Tasting the goodness of the word of God might simply refer to hearing the preaching of the word, while experiencing the powers of the age to come could simply refer to the witnessing of miracles. And none of these experiences necessarily indicates that a person is truly born again.

One initial weakness in this view is that it seems to fight against a face-value reading of the passage. This isn’t a critical flaw, since face-value interpretations aren’t always best, but it’s at least noteworthy. Yet this view has a greater problem, in my judgment. If the people spoken of are not truly born again, then why does the passage say that it’s impossible to restore them? Restore them to what? Restore them to something they never had to begin with? How does that make sense?

There’s a third view which might seem fanciful to some, but I think it deserves a place at the table. This view holds that the people spoken of in the passage are in fact true believers, but that their falling away is being presented as a hypothetical scenario, rather than something which might actually happen.

To draw an analogy, consider the way Paul talks in Galatians, when he says, “Even if we or an angel from heaven should preach to you a gospel contrary to the one we preached to you, let him be accursed” (Gal. 1:8). Here, Paul’s clearly not talking about something that might actually happen. He’s not telling the Galatians that an angel of heaven might actually preach to them a different gospel. Rather, he’s presenting this as a hypothetical scenario in order to make a strong point about something else, namely their commitment to the true gospel.

A similar rhetorical technique could be happening in Hebrews 6. When the writer speaks about true believers falling away, he’s not presenting this as something that might actually happen. Rather, he’s presenting this as a hypothetical scenario in order to make a strong point about something else, namely the finality of Christ’s work on the cross. Which is why the writer goes on to say, “they are crucifying once again the Son of God.” If someone truly becomes a partaker in the salvation that Christ purchased on the cross, and then somehow removes themselves from that salvation, then there’s no possible way to be saved again, as that would require Jesus to be crucified all over again, which is absurd.

Like I said earlier, I think each view has strengths and weaknesses. But as for my own perspective, I tend to be pulled back-and-forth between the second and third views. Just depends on the day of the week.

Thursday, August 4, 2016

On Trump and Conscience-Voting

Andy Naselli wrote a widely-circulated article about Trump a few months ago. Reading through it sparked a lot of thoughts and responses in my mind, so I figured I would put them down in writing.
“If Donald Trump is the Republican nominee for President of the United States, can you vote for him with a clear conscience?”
Yes. In fact, it’s the only thing I can do this November with a clear conscience.
“Here’s how I am currently thinking through that question as an evangelical theology professor who just coauthored a book on the conscience and the Christian.”
Not to make mountains out of molehills, but I find it really funny when people feel the need to introduce their arguments in this way. Grudem does the same kind of thing in his article: “As a professor who has taught Christian ethics for 39 years, I think their analysis is incorrect.” So I guess I’ll follow suit, just for fun: As a seminary graduate, supply preacher, and substitute school teacher, here’s my take on the matter.
“Trump publicly brags about committing adultery.”
That’s true, and there’s absolutely no excuse for it. This is easily the most regrettable thing about Trump for me. It’s depraved and shameful.

But we still have to ask the question: Does a president need to be a faithful one-woman-man in order to enact policies that are going to be good for the country? Why? What’s the logical connection there? Take Jack Kennedy for example. He was by all accounts a serial adulterer, but most people would still affirm that he was the right man for the job, and that he was good for the country. Does Kennedy’s adultery somehow nullify the ways in which he was able to better the country as president? Do we now have to pretend like he didn’t do good things? Why?

Again, this isn’t about whether or not adultery is morally excusable. It isn’t, and it ought to be denounced in the strongest terms. But the question here is to what degree something like adultery should impact our assessment of a man’s ability to be an effective president. Which job that Trump would have as president requires him to be a faithful one-woman man?
“Trump mocks and disrespects people—women, the disabled, even prisoners of war.”
Does Trump disrespect women? Naselli makes it seem like Trump has a unique animosity toward women in general, but there’s no real reason to think that. Trump has certainly attacked particular women (Rosie O’Donnell, Lena Dunham, Hillary, etc). But he’s attacked plenty of men just as fiercely. Trump doesn’t attack women any more than he attacks men.

Does Trump mock the disabled? Personally, I think this one is difficult to buy. I assume that Naselli’s referring to the moment in a South Carolina rally speech where Trump waves and shakes his arms in imitation of Serge Kovaleski, a reporter who had been trying to back-peddle something he wrote years ago. But consider a few things:

(1) Trump later said that he had never seen the reporter about which he was speaking. Obviously that could have just been a lie to cover up his mistake, but it’s at least worth noting that he claimed to have no knowledge of what Kovaleski looks like. It’s true that just before Trump made the arm motions, he said, “You gotta see this guy.” But I think in context that can reasonably be taken to mean, “You gotta see what this guy is saying now.”

(2) And when you think about it, doesn’t it honestly seem likely that Trump wouldn’t have known what Kovaleski looks like? Of all the news articles you’ve ever read, how many were authored by people whose physical appearance you would recognize? I would venture to say not many. Kovaleski does claim to have been personally acquainted with Trump back in the 80s, but given the number of reporters that Trump deals with on a daily basis, you can’t seriously expect him to remember one guy from 30+ years ago.

(3) Trump was waving and shaking his arms erratically, but from what I can tell, Kovaleski doesn’t move his arms at all. A freeze-framed photo was circulated that shows Trump’s arm positioned in a way that looks similar to Kovaleski’s. But that’s just a cheap media trick.

(4) Moreover, the motions that Trump was making are a typical way of representing someone who’s nervously trying to explain themselves after being cornered. And Trump has done the same sort of thing on other occasions as well. This video shows some examples.

The third example in that video (when he’s mimicking Cruz) is taken from a rally that happened a few months after the rally where Trump had allegedly mocked Kovaleski. So that particular instance could have been a tactical move on Trump’s part. But I think it at least shows that those same arm motions can naturally be used to imitate anyone who’s nervously trying to defend themselves.

All of this to say, I don’t think Naselli is warranted in stating that Trump mocks the disabled, as if that were an indisputable fact or something.

Does Trump disrespect prisoners of war? This is in reference to Trump’s feud with John McCain, during which Trump apparently said, “I like people who weren’t captured.” There isn’t really an excuse for this. It was a moment of poor judgment on Trump’s part. I think he let the heat of the feud get to him and resorted to a cheap shot.

I will say that I think it’s a bit naive to expect a politician to flatly admit to his mistakes and beg for forgiveness. So of course Trump tried to paper over his comments and make it seem like he never said what he said. That’s not admirable, but it’s standard fare in the world of politics. It’s certainly not a flaw that’s unique to Trump.
“Trump lacks a pro-life record.”
Naselli doesn’t elaborate on this statement himself, but he links to a National Review article by Lisa Smiley that lists out several reasons for thinking that Trump is not really pro-life. Here are some of the points made in that article:
Smiley: “In 1999, Trump described himself as ‘very pro-choice.’”
Okay? So you can’t be pro-life in 2016 if you were pro-choice in 1999? What kind of sense does that make?
Smiley: “Yet Trump has said his extremist, pro-abortion sister, Maryanne Trump Barry, would make a ‘phenomenal’ justice. . . . Of course, he said a few months later that he’d have to rule her out now.”
Actually, he said both of those things in the very same interview, and in basically the same sentence. You can watch it here, around the 16:30 mark. Every time Trump has even mentioned this idea of his sister being a Supreme Court nominee, he has unequivocally dismissed it. This past February, he said, “My sister . . . also happens to have a little bit different views than me, but I said that in a very joking manner. But my sister obviously would not be the right person. It’s a conflict of interest for me.”
Smiley: “During this year’s March for Life, [Trump] was the only Republican candidate who said nothing about abortion.”
Assuming that’s true, it’s certainly something I would have liked to see from him. And perhaps it shows that he’s less enthusiastic about the pro-life cause than he ought to be. Trump admittedly focuses most of his energy on things other than abortion, and I think he probably cares more about his presidency being remembered for things like economic growth and military success. But that doesn’t mean he’s not pro-life, and won’t appoint pro-life justices. He’s already picked an unquestionably pro-life vice president in Mike Pence.
Smiley: “[Trump] has also gone on record saying he is for the status quo of funding Planned Parenthood as it is currently funded. Yet when he was forced to clarify his stance, he finally said he would sign a bill to defund it if he became president.”
That’s a wildly inaccurate representation of the facts. He didn’t praise Planned Parenthood one day and then “finally” agree later to defund it. At about the 3:40 mark of this interview, from all the way back in July of last year, Trump said that Planned Parenthood should “absolutely” be defunded, giving no qualifications. Later, in an interview with Sean Hannity, Trump said this: “There’s two Planned Parenthood’s in a way. You have it as an abortion clinic — now that’s actually a fairly small part of what they do, but it’s a brutal part. . . . I’m totally against the abortion aspect of Planned Parenthood.”

Do I agree with Trump’s assessment of Planned Parenthood? No, of course not, and I wish he were a lot harder on the organization than he is. But I’m at least sensible enough to recognize that every time he does speak to this issue, he clearly repudiates Planned Parenthood’s practice of abortion and supports defunding that “aspect” of the organization. Now compare his outlook to Hillary’s.

Now I’m switching back to quoting Naselli’s article.
“[Trump] is no pro-lifer.”
Again, Naselli doesn’t elaborate. But he links to an article by Robert George, who argues that Trump gave himself away as a phony pro-lifer whenever he said that women who have illegal abortions should be punished. I’ve already responded to this incident here on the blog, and I think it was an extremely silly criticism of Trump that frankly shed light on the desperation of many within the never-Trump cause.

As a side note, consider that Robert George argues that Mitt Romney similarly gave himself away as a phony conservative whenever he described himself as “severely” conservative, because “no conservative would ever describe conservatism (or his own conservatism) as severe.” Talk about superficial.
“[Trump] can’t even defend the pro-life position.”
Here, Naselli links to a post by Denny Burk, who comments on a video of a Face the Nation interview with Trump. Here are my thoughts on that video, and the comments Trump made in it.

I’ll probably get laughed out of court for this first remark, but for what it’s worth, it’s really hard for me to bank very much on a video interview that shows so many obvious signs of having been edited. I’m not even trying to say that it was maliciously edited necessarily, but in order to accurately follow conversations like these, you really need to be sure that you’re hearing all that was said, and in the exact order that it was said. And this video gives me multiple reasons to doubt that that’s what we’re getting. But even if you think I’m grasping with this point, there are still other points to consider.

It’s important to keep in mind that in this interview, Trump was trying to clarify his earlier comments about illegal abortions being punishable. That’s why he was emphasizing the fact that the question he had been asked on that occasion (by Chris Matthews) pertained to a hypothetical scenario in which abortion is illegal. And it’s in that context that Trump clarifies his stance by saying, “The laws are set now on abortion, and that’s the way they’re going to remain until they’re changed.” What he’s doing is clarifying that he doesn’t believe women should be punished for abortions in the here and now, with the laws currently as they are.

Eventually, the interviewer asks Trump if there were any specific things about abortion law that he would like to change, to which Trump responded: “At this moment, the laws are set and I think we have to leave it that way.” Now, assuming this was precisely the way the Q&A transpired, I think Trump’s actually just dodging the interviewer’s real question and repeating the same line from earlier.  I think that for Trump, this whole interview was about defending himself against criticisms of his earlier remarks.

I do think it was a sloppy answer on Trump’s part, and he should have done better. But I don’t think that this by any means exposes him as a phony pro-lifer who won’t do anything to help the pro-life cause. Give me a break. He has repeatedly denounced abortion, repeatedly supported defunding Planned Parenthood, repeatedly affirmed that he would appoint pro-life justices, and has already picked a pro-life VP. Now compare that with Hillary.

Is Trump pro-life? I think he is, although he’s far more timid about it than I would like him to be. Yet in November, when I’m faced with a choice between someone who’s timidly pro-life and someone who’s radically pro-abortion, who should I choose? The question answers itself. It’s not even a little bit difficult for me.
“Trump is a demagogue. He appeals to popular desires and prejudices rather than by using rational argument.”
Aside from the fact that this is an extreme generalization, we’re talking about the world of politics here. What presidential candidate doesn’t seek to appeal to popular desires and prejudices? How often do you hear a rational argument come from any presidential candidate? It’s really surprising that Naselli and others find this to be a characteristic that’s unique to Trump.
“We cannot trust what [Trump] says because of his character.”
There is an internal tension in the never-Trump mindset. They insist that we can’t trust what Trump says. Unless of course, he says something damning – then we can trust what he says unquestionably. They go back-and-forth between “His word means nothing” and “Look, he said it himself!”
“He lacks sound principles and judgment. The only principle that Trump seems to follow is self-interest. Like the dwarves in The Last Battle, Trump is for Trump.”
That’s a completely subjective assessment that has no persuasive power.
“But what if the two most viable candidates are Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton? . . . Can the most viable candidates be so bad that you cannot dignify either of them with your vote?”
I think the disagreement between Christians over Trump has a lot to do with different understandings of what voting means. Here, Naselli describes a vote as a way of “dignifying” a candidate. But in November, I won’t be viewing my vote as a way of ascribing dignity to Trump as an individual. My vote is simply an indication of which candidate, given the options, I believe will do better things for the country. That’s all.
“If the two most viable candidates were Hitler and Stalin, would you feel obligated to vote for the lesser evil?”
Potentially, yes, assuming it was clearly discernible which one was a lesser evil. Although I find it completely ludicrous to compare Trump with Hitler or Stalin. On the other hand, I don’t think that’s a ludicrous comparison when it comes to Hillary.

Frankly, it puzzles me that a lot of evangelicals find it tacky to compare Hillary with Hitler. The Holocaust was obviously horrific, resulting in the deaths of somewhere between six and eleven million Jews. But how does that compare with the abortion industry, which is responsible for the deaths of 60 million babies since Roe vs. Wade? And this is something that Hillary and the Democrats celebrate. They would have that number continue to rise. When people find it tacky to compare Hillary with Hitler, it’s hard for me not to assume that they simply don’t think abortion is as horrendous as it actually is.

Furthermore, it’s odd that there are people who would be fine with comparing abortion to the Holocaust, but not comfortable with comparing someone like Hillary to Hitler. That doesn’t add up to me.
“The strategy to vote for the lesser of two evils breaks down at some point. You must draw the line somewhere.”
These are just empty assertions. The strategy itself assumes that there is a clearly discernible lesser of two evils. So why does the strategy break down at some point? Naselli is assuming what he needs to prove.
“Southern Baptist leader Russell Moore argues, ‘If a Christian doctor were forced to choose between performing abortions or assisting suicides, she could not choose the lesser of these two evils but must conscientiously object.’”
That analogy is patently ridiculous. Voting for Trump is nowhere near tantamount to performing abortions or assisting suicides. This goes back to what I said earlier about how the debate hinges on our different understandings of what a vote means. Your vote does not amount to complicity in anything evil that your candidate might do. This is why if Thabiti Anyabwile ends up voting for Hillary (heaven forbid), I would describe it as foolish, but not as complicity in abortion.
“But remember: It is a sin to violate your conscience—even if your conscience is mistaken. If your conscience tells you that it is wrong to vote for Donald Trump and you vote for him anyway, then you sinned. So unless you can vote for Donald Trump without your conscience condemning you, then you should not vote for him.”
To be honest, I find a lot of this talk about “conscience” to be supremely unhelpful. Naselli himself affirms that “conscience” can lead people in different directions. The Christians who are choosing to vote for Trump are doing so because they believe voting for Trump is the right thing to do in this situation. On the other hand, the Christians who are choosing not to vote for Trump are doing so because they believe voting for Trump is the wrong thing to do in this situation.

So how is it helpful to say, “Vote your conscience”? It’s tantamount to saying, “Just do what you feel is right.” But that isn’t consistent at all with the first part of Naselli’s article, where he was vigorously trying to persuade everyone that it’s wrong to vote for Donald Trump. Don’t say “vote your conscience” unless you truly mean it, because come November, that’s exactly what I and many other Christians will be doing when we go out and vote for Trump.

Now if I may speak candidly, I find that it’s the never-Trump camp who talks the most about “conscience,” and it often feels like they’re just trying to stake the moral high ground in the debate. I frequently get the impression that they’re employing the idea of conscience not as a sincere and friendly equalizer, but as a way of trying to underhandedly prick the consciences of Trump voters.

As a case in point, notice how Naselli only applies his conscience principle in the direction of those who would vote for Trump. He says, “If your conscience tells you that it is wrong to vote for Donald Trump and you vote for him anyway, then you sinned.” But if Naselli were consistent, he should be just as willing to affirm the reverse by saying, “If your conscience tells you that it is wrong to vote for anyone but Donald Trump, and you don’t vote for him, then you sinned.” But Naselli doesn’t apply his principle in that direction. His conscience rhetoric is only employed against Trump voters.
“It’s also worth thinking about how your conscience has worked in the past. Many conservatives argued in 1998 that the Lewinsky scandal disqualified Bill Clinton as president, but some of those same people are planning to vote for Trump. What changed?”
First off, see how Naselli keeps aiming his conscience rhetoric at Trump voters?

Second, the only thing that changed is the whole entire situation. Imagine that the situation back in 1998 had been that if Clinton were to resign, then another president would take over who was manifestly worse than Clinton on all the issues that Christians care about (abortion, religious liberty, etc). Don’t you think this might have changed the way Christians thought through Clinton’s resignation? And rightly so? And if that had been the situation, would people like Naselli have argued that Clinton should resign nevertheless? If not, then I think they should stop trying to castigate Trump voters with this shallow comparison.

Even Naselli himself admits to altering his own principles whenever a new situation presents new challenges. Earlier in the article, he said that he had always consistently voted according to Buckley’s rule (lesser of two evils) until this election, which has caused him to question Buckley’s rule. So we might ask Naselli, what changed? Well, the situation changed, of course.

Friday, July 29, 2016

Answering Vines: Part 2

So it took me a little over a year to get around to this. Just to refresh your memory, Matthew Vines, an advocate of Christian homosexuality, wrote an article titled “40 Questions for Christians Who Oppose Marriage Equality.” I decided to write some responses to Vines’s questions, and you can read the first half of those responses here. Again, I’m not answering every single question; just the ones that particularly interested me.
“Do you believe that the Bible explicitly teaches that all gay Christians must be single and celibate for life?”
I believe that the Bible explicitly condemns the practice of homosexuality. The Bible doesn’t operate with the category of “gay Christian,” so obviously it wouldn’t explicitly teach that “gay Christians must be single and celibate for life.” But if the Bible explicitly condemns the practice of homosexuality (as it does), then it clearly follows that Christians who feel same-sex attraction must refrain from acting on those feelings.

This is not difficult logic. But Vines is trying to get a lot of mileage out of that word “explictly.” And you can excuse a lot of terrible things by claiming that the Bible doesn’t explicitly forbid them.
“If not, do you feel comfortable affirming something that is not explicitly affirmed in the Bible?”
Yes, absolutely. And we do this all the time.
“Do you believe that the moral distinction between lust and love matters for LGBT people’s romantic relationships? Do you think that loving same-sex relationships should be assessed in the same way as the same-sex behavior Paul explicitly describes as lustful in Romans 1?”
My short answer (to the second question) is yes. But I’m mainly including these two questions for future reference. Because I’d like everyone to take note of the fact that, at this point, Vines wants us to understand that he’s advocating loving same-sex behavior, which in his mind is entirely different than the purely lustful same-sex behavior described in Romans 1.
“Do you believe that Paul’s use of the terms ‘shameful’ and ‘unnatural’ in Romans 1:26-27 means that all same-sex relationships are sinful?”
Yes. (This question is only asked in order to set up the next one.)
“Would you say the same about Paul’s description of long hair in men as ‘shameful’ and against ‘nature’ in 1 Corinthians 11:14, or would you say he was describing cultural norms of his time?”
I don’t think that Paul was describing cultural norms of his time in that passage either. So I do affirm that long hair on men (as well as short hair on women) is contrary to nature, but that doesn’t make those things morally equivalent to homosexuality. Homosexual practice is regularly and severely condemned in ways that unnatural hair-length is not.

Lying and murder are not morally equivalent, despite the fact that they’re both sins. Similarly, homosexual practice and unnatural hair-lengths are not morally equivalent, despite the fact that they’re both contrary to nature.

But the most interesting part about this question is how Vines has now completely changed his argument. Remember how just a couple of questions ago, he wanted us to think that Romans 1 was condemning only a purely-lustful sort of same-sex behavior (as opposed to loving same-sex behavior)? Well, now he wants us to believe that Romans 1 was simply describing cultural norms of Paul’s day and age. But those two lines of argument don’t fit together. Which is it?
“Do you believe that the capacity for procreation is essential to marriage? If so, what does that mean for infertile heterosexual couples?”
I believe that godly offspring is one of very reasons God established marriage in the first place (Mal. 2:14–15). So anybody who gets married I think ought to be doing so with plans of having and raising children.

Of course, there are married couples who are infertile. But that doesn’t make their marriage pointless. For one thing, infertile couples can adopt. And those adopted children will be better off having a mom and a dad who are married to each other. Yet even if an infertile couple chooses not to adopt, that still doesn’t make their marriage pointless. The intimacy, companionship, and commitment of their marriage is still a valid representation of Christ and the church.

But if two dudes try to emulate this same marital intimacy, then they’re participating in something that the Bible plainly forbids (which in all honesty is really the center of this whole debate).
“How much time have you spent engaging with the writings of LGBT-affirming Christians like Justin Lee, James Brownson, and Rachel Murr?”
Basically none, which is entirely irrelevant. Nobody has to read all the scholars on one side of a debate before they’re allowed to express their own informed position. That’s just silly.

I’ve listened to/watched a couple of debates and presentations that Vines himself has done, and my assumption is that he would present his strongest material in those settings. And yet none of it has persuaded me. To be frank, life’s just too short to spend hours reading authors that are going to make the same feeble arguments that Vines is making, only with scholarly verbosity. I’m happy to leave that sort of thing to the likes of Robert Gagnon.
“What relationship recognition rights short of marriage do you support for same-sex couples?”
The exact same relationship recognition rights short of marriage that I support for heterosexual couples, which is none. Why would the government have any interest at all in relationships short of marriage, whether heterosexual or homosexual?
“Do you know who Tyler Clementi, Leelah Alcorn, and Blake Brockington are, and did your church offer any kind of prayer for them when their deaths made national news?”
Obviously, all three of those deaths were tragic, but the concerns of a local church aren’t determined by what’s in the headlines, especially not when such tragedies are being politicized to promote an LGBT agenda.
“Have you vocally objected when church leaders and other Christians have compared same-sex relationships to things like bestiality, incest, and pedophilia?”
No, I haven’t. But what’s interesting to me is that all three of those perversions that Vines just mentioned (bestiality, incest, and pedophilia) have been gaining more acceptance lately, using many of the same arguments by which homosexuality gained acceptance. So why is Vines so hateful toward those who feel such attractions?

But I have another thought at this point. If you were to try and argue against homosexuality by appealing to Leviticus, Vines’s standard response would be to say that the Old Testament law isn’t binding on Christians. So my question is, how would Vines argue biblically against things like bestiality and incest? Remember, the Old Testament law is off limits, and also recall that, according to Vines, we shouldn’t feel comfortable condemning anything that the Bible doesn’t explicitly forbid.

Tuesday, July 26, 2016

Election (The Political Kind)

Below is a recent Twitter exchange I had with some friends of mine. This post is primarily for the purpose of giving us a place to talk more extensively via comments. We just can’t seem to stop talking about election. Back in the day it was the theological kind. Now it’s the political kind.














Saturday, July 23, 2016

Friday, July 15, 2016

Hairdo Hermeneutics

A guy named Luke Geraty wrote a piece a while back on the issue of hair length in 1 Corinthians 11. I came across it recently and felt that it would be a good foil to use in putting down some thoughts on the issue. It’s a good example of the standard way in which modern Christians interpret the passage.

But the first thing I want to establish here at the front end is that while everything the Bible says is important, there are some things that are of first importance and other things that are not even close to that. So let it be heard loud and clear that I think the hair-length question belongs in that second category.

I do take a view on the issue, and it’s a view that I think is reasonably defensible exegetically. But I’m open to the possibility that I’ve misunderstood Paul, and I don’t for a minute assume that anyone with a non-traditional hair length is a pagan or a second-class Christian. It just isn’t that kind of issue to me. The topic mainly interests me for the hermeneutics that are involved. Not everything deserves a crusade, and so I tend to scratch my head at organizations that characterize themselves entirely by a particular view on questions of this sort.

With that said, and hopefully heard, here is the passage under consideration:
[3] But I want you to understand that the head of every man is Christ, the head of a wife is her husband, and the head of Christ is God. [4] Every man who prays or prophesies with his head covered dishonors his head, [5] but every wife who prays or prophesies with her head uncovered dishonors her head, since it is the same as if her head were shaven. [6] For if a wife will not cover her head, then she should cut her hair short. But since it is disgraceful for a wife to cut off her hair or shave her head, let her cover her head. [7] For a man ought not to cover his head, since he is the image and glory of God, but woman is the glory of man. [8] For man was not made from woman, but woman from man. [9] Neither was man created for woman, but woman for man. [10] That is why a wife ought to have a symbol of authority on her head, because of the angels. [11] Nevertheless, in the Lord woman is not independent of man nor man of woman; [12] for as woman was made from man, so man is now born of woman. And all things are from God. [13] Judge for yourselves: is it proper for a wife to pray to God with her head uncovered? [14] Does not nature itself teach you that if a man wears long hair it is a disgrace for him, [15] but if a woman has long hair, it is her glory? For her hair is given to her for a covering. [16] If anyone is inclined to be contentious, we have no such practice, nor do the churches of God. (1 Cor. 11:3–16)
Alright, now here are some things Geraty said.
Geraty: “The apostle is discussing the issue of head coverings . . . It has nothing to do with Paul teaching that women were required to have long hair. . . . Again, to make this passage about hair length is to miss the entire point of the text. Garland makes this clear when he writes, ‘That he specifically mentions hair in these verses does not mean that hair has been the topic throughout this section . . . It is brought up only as a final illustration as to why women should have a cover but men should not.’ (1 Corinthians, 530)”
This is an extremely common tactic in exegetical debates: appealing to the main point of a passage as a way of minimizing a secondary point of the passage. It’s as though Geraty and Garland think that if the passage is primarily about head coverings, then we’re somehow taking it “out of context” if we look for it to teach us about anything else. I’ll be the first to acknowledge that the passage is primarily concerned with head coverings, but in the course of making God-breathed statements about head coverings, Paul makes God-breathed statements about other things as well. And one of those other things is hair-length.
Geraty: “The apostle is discussing the issue of head coverings and is actually stating that even though the women in the ancient world had longer hair, which was their glory, they needed a head covering. That is the point.
But that doesn’t seem to be the point at all. Isn’t it interesting that I’ve slowly and carefully read this passage multiple times and didn’t take it to mean anything like Geraty’s summary? This leads me to a general observation: In exegetical debates like these, I think we need to be honest about who has the advantage of the most straight-forward reading. And we should feel no hesitation in conceding that advantage to our opponents sometimes, because the most straight-forward reading of a passage is not always the best.

So when it comes to those who argue, based on 1 Corinthians 11, that men should have short hair and women should have long hair, I think it’s fair to say that they have the most straight-forward reading of the passage. Again, that doesn’t mean they’re right. They may still be wrong. But I certainly don’t think it’s fair to characterize their interpretation as fanciful eisegesis.

Be that as it may, let’s examine the specifics of what Geraty just said. First, he emphasizes that the passage is simply about “women in the ancient world” (i.e. not women in our modern world) and how long hair was simply “their glory” (i.e. not modern women’s glory). But what reasons does the passage itself give us for thinking that Paul was simply referring to a cultural custom of that day? Are there any at all? I’m not denying that sometimes our interpretation of a passage needs to be tempered by cultural considerations, but I think we need to at least try to have a sound exegetical basis for it.

Second, Geraty says Paul’s point is that even though the women had long hair, they still needed a head covering. But that doesn’t seem to square with the text either, particularly verse 15: “For her hair is given to her for a covering.” A woman’s long hair is a natural covering that God has given her. So what need is there for an artificial one?

In all fairness, there are plenty of things about this passage that are perplexing to me as well. For example, I don’t understand how verse 15 squares with verse 6: “If a wife will not cover her head, then she should cut her hair short.” But if what I just said about verse 15 is right, then the logic of verse 6 doesn’t add up to me. If a woman won’t wear a head covering, why must she then cut her hair short? I digress.

Garety eventually quotes a lengthy passage from Craig Blomberg.
Blomberg: “Careful attention to the nature of Paul’s argumentation in this passage supports these consensus views. When he speaks explicitly of length of hair, he grounds his arguments in what is proper (v. 13), normal practice (vv. 14–15) and contemporary custom (v. 16). None of these verses, as we have seen in the discussion of original meaning, implies a timeless, transcultural mandate . . .”
(1) One thing that we need to keep straight as we interpret and apply this passage is when it’s talking about head coverings vs. when it’s talking about hair-length. Blomberg seems to conflate the two ideas. He makes points about hair-length by appealing to verses that are talking about head coverings. In verse 13, Paul doesn’t even mention hair length. He’s talking about head coverings there.

(2) In verses 14–15, what version is Blomberg reading? By what scholarly sorcery does he take something that Paul says nature teaches, and turn it into a simple cultural norm? If there is one word in this entire passage that keeps me from buying into the idea that Paul’s hair-length standards were simply cultural, it’s the word nature in verse 14. Nature is what teaches us that “if a man wears long hair it is a disgrace for him, but if a woman has long hair, it is her glory.” Not culture. Nature.

(3) Verse 16 is admittedly tough to pin down: “If anyone is inclined to be contentious, we have no such practice, nor do the churches of God.” I’m not sure what this “practice” is intended to refer to. It could be referring to the practice of artificial head covering. Or it could be referring to the inclination to contentiousness. I don’t think it’s likely that Paul’s referring to hair length here, since he’s already grounded hair length in nature (vv. 14–15). And keep in mind that Blomberg is presenting verse 16 as an example of when Paul “speaks explicitly of length of hair,” despite the fact that the verse says nothing about hair length.
Blomberg: “When Paul does ground his commands in the order and purpose of creation (vv. 8–9), he does so to support his statements that husbands are the image and glory of God and that wives are the glory of their husbands (v. 7).
Yea, but after verse 9 is verse 10, where Paul says that for those very same creation-order reasons, a wife ought to have a symbol of authority on her head. And as an additional reason for this, he throws in “because of the angels” at the end of verse 10. Now that’s certainly an obscure reference that I would love for Paul to have elaborated on. But to say the very least, if Paul grounds the practice of head covering by an appeal to some aspect of the spiritual realm, that doesn’t immediately make me think “cultural custom.”

But again, these verses have more to do with head coverings than with hair length per se.
Blomberg: “When in a particular culture, appropriate honor to God and husband cannot be maintained without certain head coverings, such coverings must be used. When covered or uncovered heads and long or short hair imply nothing about one’s religious commitment or marital faithfulness, worrying about the appearance of one’s physical head in these ways becomes unnecessary.”
That’s great practical wisdom as long as it’s true that Paul’s hair-length standards were simply the cultural custom of that day. But I don’t think that’s been adequately demonstrated. Now back to Geraty.
Geraty: “Here are questions I have for those who suggest that Christian women are biblically required to have long hair:”
I’d just like to point out that we’re talking just as much about expectations for men as for women.
Geraty: “Just how long is long enough? Must it be to the middle of the back? Or must it never ever be cut? What is the appropriate length, and how is that determined? What Scriptures give that length?”
Questions like these are an attempt to make the issue seem more complicated than it actually is. But the problems with this sort of tactic are manifold.

(1) The original audience of 1 Corinthians could just as easily have asked Paul the exact same fastidious questions (even if this were all just a cultural custom). My guess is that they probably never did ask Paul such questions. Why? Because figuring out what’s long hair as opposed to short hair is not rocket science. Not then and not now.

(2) I imagine that people who argue for traditional hair-lengths are often characterized as pharisaical. But nothing is more like a Pharisee than to become preoccupied with the minutia of law-keeping. This is the kind of mindset that would lead some Jews to start wondering whether or not they were allowed to pee on the Sabbath day. I’m not really interested in wranglings of that sort.

(3) By the way, does Geraty ask these kinds of a questions when it comes to other biblical requirements? Flee fornication! “Well, what exactly is fornication? Just how chaste is chaste enough?” I’ll give him the benefit of the doubt and assume that this is just a debate tactic for this particular occasion.

(4) For the first 75% of Geraty’s post, he was expressing his disapproval of the view that men should have short hair and women should have long hair. But in order to even disapprove of that view, you have to have an idea in your mind of what it means to have short or long hair.

And of course Geraty already has such an idea in his mind. Because he’s a normal human being. My guess is that if Geraty witnessed a robbery, and the police needed to know if the suspect’s hair was short or long, he would be able to tell them without any difficulty. This is ordinary human language we’re using. There’s no need for a precise number of inches to be prescribed. A variety of lengths can fall under the category of long, and a variety of lengths can fall under the category of short.
Geraty: “The Bible can also be read in a way that would require women to never wear gold because both Paul and Peter state that women should not wear gold (1 Tim. 2:9; cf. 1 Pet. 3:3). . . . Who gets to decide which cultural standards still matter?”
Well, I think that’s just a simple misunderstanding of those verses. Peter and Paul both say that a woman should not adorn herself with such things: gold, pearls, braided hair, etc. But what does adorn mean? Peter says that the woman’s adorning should not include clothing: “Do not let your adorning be . . . the clothing you wear” (1 Pet. 3:3). Of course, that doesn’t mean she shouldn’t wear clothes. So adorning is not the same as simply wearing.

A woman’s adorning is whatever she puts forth as the most valuable things about her as a person. It’s the things she most desires for others to see about her. So both Peter and Paul are telling women not to let their adorning be material things like their jewelry and such, but immaterial character qualities like good deeds, modesty, self-control, the hidden person of the heart, a gentle and quiet spirit, etc.

So bringing this back to the issue at hand: There are good exegetical reasons for rejecting the idea that women shouldn’t wear gold, but are there good exegetical reasons for rejecting the idea that men should have short hair and women should have long hair? That’s what Geraty still needs to demonstrate.
Geraty: “I have also observed that many of these same people who state that women with short hair are disobeying Scripture rarely wear head coverings (hats?) during public worship gatherings. Why? Because that was “cultural” and women in America aren’t required to wear a head covering anymore. Hmmm. Sounds like selective biblical interpretation to me!”
Here I’ll just reiterate something I said earlier. Even though head coverings and hair length are closely tied together in this passage, they’re not the same issue. It seems to me that there’s plenty of room for taking the position that Paul’s statements about hair-length are transcultural, while his statements about artificial head coverings are not:

(1) Paul never says that artificial head coverings are something that nature teaches, but he does say that about hair length (v. 14).

(2) Paul says that a woman’s long hair is a natural covering (v. 15), which would seem to remove the need for an artificial one.

(3) Paul may be referring to artificial head coverings in verse 16, when he says “we have no such practice, nor do the churches of God.”